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Macroeconomic News and Real Interest Rates
Kevin L. Kliesen and Frank A. Schmid
Their comments suggest that key information
is contained in the evolving flow of these data
that informs policymakers’ assessments of the
strength of the economy and perhaps also affects
the future stance of policy. 
Moreover, studies with macroeconomic
announcement data suggest that surprises in the
data can influence such things as the market price
of Treasury securities or inflation expectations.
We focus our analysis on the relationship between
surprise data announcements and the yield on
Treasury inflation-indexed securities (TIIS, a
measure of the real interest rate) from January
1997 through June 2003. Consider this example:
Suppose the Federal Reserve and financial market
participants view the monthly jobs number within
the employment report released by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics as a reliable indicator of the near-
term strength of the economy. In this case, a posi-
tive (negative) surprise would signal to the Fed
and the markets that the economy was growing
F
ederal Reserve officials often make
remarks and offer their thoughts in
public forums. Recent comments by
Bill Poole and Janet Yellen, of the
Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis and San
Francisco, respectively, have added to the discus-
sion of the role of economic data in monetary
policy:
“I think there has been an effort to emphasize
that increasingly, the policy decisions will
be data-driven, driven by incoming 
information…”1
“Uncertainties and risks that could complicate
things considerably were evident even before
the havoc unleashed by Hurricane Katrina, so
our approach during this phase must be par-
ticularly dependent on information from
incoming data.”2
Economic news affects the perceptions of investors, forecasters, and policymakers about the
strength or weakness of the economy. These expectations are updated on the basis of regularly
occurring surprises in macroeconomic announcement data. The response of asset prices to positive
or negative announcement surprises has been a regular feature of the literature for more than 20
years. In this vein, the authors evaluate the responses of the yield of 10-year Treasury inflation-
indexed securities to nearly three dozen macroeconomic announcements. They find that the real
long-term rate of interest responds positively to surprises in a handful of key macroeconomic
indicators, including labor productivity growth. Also, the authors find no support for the propo-
sition that the Federal Reserve has information about its actions or the state of the real economy
that is not in the pubic domain and, hence, not already priced in the real long-term interest rate.
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these circumstances, the demand for investment
goods would be expected to increase (decrease)
and the real interest rate would have to rise (fall)
to clear the market.
There are many other examples of news that
might affect real long-term interest rates (such as
a surprise increase in labor productivity growth
or in the government budget deficit). But it is not
our intention here to test the theory that budget
deficits cause higher interest rates or to model the
real rate of interest in a macroeconomic setting.
Rather, we simply test whether there is a core set
of economic variables that traders in the TIIS
market respond to more than others. Along these
lines, other potential influences on the TIIS market
are actions and commentary by Federal Reserve
officials. Accordingly, we also test whether TIIS
investors re-price the real long-term interest
rate in response to surprises in monetary policy
actions. 
We look at the data from January 31, 1997,
through June 30, 2003, and ask whether the real
long-term rate of interest responds to a sample of
35 surprise economic announcements from that
period, as well as to the surprises in the federal
funds interest rate target. We measure the real
long-term rate of interest of on-the-run (that is,
most recently issued) 10-year TIIS. We gauge
surprises in macroeconomic announcements by
the difference between the expected value and
the actual released value of the data series. The
former is the median forecast among a sample of
forecasters and market participants. Except for
the growth of real GDP, the GDP price index, and
nonfarm labor productivity (there are forecasts
for the preliminary and revised growth rates),
the latter is the first-reported value for the series. 
Our analysis suggests that participants in the
TIIS market respond to the announcements for
seven economic data series in a statistically sig-
nificant manner: business inventories, the employ-
ment cost index, the preliminary GDP estimate,
initial jobless claims, new home sales, nonfarm
payroll employment, and the preliminary estimate
of nonfarm labor productivity. Finally, we fail to
reject the hypothesis that uncertainty surround-
ing the real long-term interest rate is unaffected
by Federal Reserve communication and surprises
in monetary policy actions. Taking into consid-
eration both those results in our analysis, we find
no support for the proposition that the Federal
Reserve has information about its own actions or
the state of the real economy that is not in the
pubic domain and, hence, priced in the real long-
term interest rate.
RELATED LITERATURE
The studies most closely related to our work
are Calomiris et al. (2003), Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2003), and Kohn and Sack (2003).
Calomiris et al. study the response of the real
interest rate, as measured by the market yield of
the 10-year TIIS, to surprises in 19 macroeconomic
data releases, among them the monthly federal
budget deficit/surplus reported by the U.S.
Treasury Department. Surprises in labor produc-
tivity or monetary policy announcements are
not included in the regression. Calomiris et al.
find that surprises in the federal budget surplus
cause no statistically significant change in the
real interest rate. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2003) analyze the response of the forward real
interest rate to surprises in macroeconomic data
releases and in Federal Reserve monetary policy
actions—that is, changes to the targeted federal
funds rate set by the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC). Their forward rates are
derived from the yields of 10-year TIIS.3 The
authors fail to reject the hypothesis that the “long-
term equilibrium real rate of interest” is unaffected
by surprises in these productivity and federal
budget numbers. In a separate regression,
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) study
the impact on the same dependent variable of
surprises in announced changes of the targeted
Kliesen and Schmid
134 MARCH/APRIL 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
3 The studied pair of 1-year forward rates applies to the 12-month
time window between the maturity dates of the on-the-run 10-year
TIIS and the 10-year TIIS issued 12 months earlier. Prior to July
2002, and starting in 1997, 10-year TIIS were issued only once per
year, in January. This implies that the authors analyze changes to
the 1-year real interest rate that is expected to prevail at the begin-
ning of a 12-month time window that begins, on average, 8.5 years
from the time of the data release. The analyzed time period runs
from January 1997 through July 2002 and covers 39 macroeconomic
data series. federal funds rate; again, the authors do not reject
the null hypothesis of no influence.4 Faust et al.
(2006) estimate a Kalman filter approach in
gauging the surprise effect of macroeconomic
announcements to the U.S. dollar exchange rate
and to nominal (short- and long-term) interest
rates. These authors find that the surprises in such
announcements for a wide variety of macroeco-
nomic variables have a statistically significant
effect on the dollar and interest rates.
Kohn and Sack (2003) study the effect of
Federal Reserve communication on financial
variables using daily observations for the period
January 3, 1989, through April 7, 2003. In their
analysis, Fed communication comprises state-
ments released by the FOMC and, since June 1996,
Congressional testimonies and speeches delivered
by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Kohn and
Sack make no attempt to gauge the influence on
the level of Treasury yields; rather, the authors
measure the effect of Fed communication on
Treasury yield volatility. Kohn and Sack investi-
gate the effect that Federal Reserve communica-
tion has on various financial variables, such as
the yields (to maturity) of the nominal 2-year and
10-year Treasury notes. Kohn and Sack find that
statements of the FOMC and testimonies of the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve have a statisti-
cally significant impact on the variance of 2-year
and 10-year Treasury note yields; no such influ-
ence was found for the Chairman’s speeches. We
build on Kohn and Sack when studying the effect
of Federal Reserve communication on the (con-
ditional) variance of the yield of the 10-year TIIS
or, put differently, on the uncertainty that sur-
rounds the real long-term rate of interest.
THE DATA
Our analysis covers the period from January 31,
1997, through June 30, 2003. The starting date of
this sample period is determined by the avail-
ability of the 10-year TIIS yield; the ending date
is determined by the series of macroeconomic data
releases provided by Money Market Services
(MMS). The dataset comprises median polled
forecast values for 38 macroeconomic data series,
along with the sample standard deviations of
these forecast values. The MMS survey is con-
ducted every Friday morning among senior econ-
omists and bond traders with major commercial
banks, brokerage houses, and some consulting
firms, mostly in the greater New York, Chicago,
and San Francisco areas. Among these 38 vari-
ables in the survey, there are three items—CPI,
PPI, and retail sales—for which there also exists
a “core” measure. Although the comprehensive
versions of the CPI and the PPI include food and
energy items, the respective core measures do not.
For retail sales, the narrowly defined concept
excludes motor vehicles and parts. In the regres-
sion analysis, we use the core concepts only; this
leaves us with 35 macroeconomic variables.5
We relate daily changes in the real long-term
rate of interest to the surprise component in
macroeconomic data releases. Like Gürkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2003), we define the surprise
component as the difference between the actual
and the median forecast values; but unlike these
authors (and unlike Calomiris et al.), we normal-
ize these surprises by the sample standard devia-
tion of the individual forecasts, which we take to
be a measure of forecaster uncertainty surround-
ing these expectations. In the literature, normal-
izing announcement surprises, though common,
is not universal.6 We also control for the surprise
component in changes (or the absence thereof) of
the targeted federal funds rate, which we measure
as suggested by Kuttner (2001) and discussed by
Watson (2002). For each scheduled and unsched-
Kliesen and Schmid
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5 We find no statistically significant difference, for any of our statis-
tical analyses, between the core and the comprehensive measures.
6 Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999) calculate the surprise com-
ponent by normalizing the difference between the actual and the
forecast values by the mean absolute difference observed for the
respective variable during the sample period. Balduzzi, Elton,
and Green (2001) normalize the difference between the actual and
the forecast values by the standard deviation of this difference
during the sample period. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)
normalize the announcement surprise by its standard error. Faust
et al. (2006) simply use a non-normalized forecast error (surprise)
in their analysis of intraday exchange rate and nominal interest
rate data.
4 These findings of surprises in macroeconomic data releases and
monetary policy actions on real interest rates are included only in
the Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson working paper (2003) but not
in the published version (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005).uled FOMC meeting, we scaled up by 30/(k +1)
the change of the price of the federal funds futures
contract for the current month on the day of the
FOMC meeting, t, where t + k denotes the last
calendar day of the month.7 (Note that this vari-
able is not on the same scale as the surprise com-
ponent in the macroeconomic data releases.) In a
sensitivity analysis, we use an alternative meas-
ure of the surprise component in monetary policy
actions; this alternative measure, devised by Poole
and Rasche (2000), rests on price changes of
federal funds futures contracts also.8 Finally, we
control for Federal Reserve communication and
actions. Our concept of Federal Reserve commu-
nication comprises (i) the Fed Chairman’s semi-
annual testimony to Congress (formerly known as
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony) and (ii) speeches
and other testimonies of the Fed Chairman.
In announcement studies, the timing of the
data releases can sometimes be an issue. This is
particularly true if intraday observations are used.
In this paper, there are two potential timing issues,
neither of which is likely to significantly influence
the results because we do not use intraday prices.
First, most data releases occur in the morning at
8:30 and 10:00 eastern standard time. However,
there are some releases that occur in the afternoon,
such as consumer credit and the budget surplus/
deficit, and some that have an irregular release
time (auto and truck sales). This is also the case
with Fed speeches and testimonies, which can
occur when markets are open or closed. A second
potential issue are data releases and speeches
that occur on holidays or when the markets are
closed. Data releases on days when the markets
were closed were moved to the next trading day
(the day on which this information was priced
in the marketplace). We also moved Federal
Reserve communication to the next trading day
if this communication occurred after hours (that
is, after the real interest rate had been recorded)
or on days on which there was no trading. Thus,
in some cases, U.S. markets will have a shorter
time period in which to react to the announce-
ment surprise, while in other cases they will have
a longer time period.
Table 1 shows the frequency of the macro-
economic announcements during the period of
analysis (January 1997 through June 2003). The
number in parentheses—the number of data
releases during the analyzed time period—differs
because of missing values in the recorded real
interest rate. For example, there are 77 observa-
tions (surprises) for most monthly variables, such
as business inventories. Of the 77 observations
for business inventories, 68 were used. Note that
Table 1 also includes two monetary policy vari-
ables and one Fed communication variable. We
also report matches for scheduled and unsched-
uled FOMC meetings—the federal funds target
variable, the surprise component of which was
calculated as outlined above—and the two Federal
Reserve communication variables defined above.
The only weekly series in the dataset, initial job-
less claims, has the highest frequency. The next-
to-highest frequency is observed for testimonies
other than semiannual testimony to Congress,
followed by monthly data releases, FOMC actions
(federal funds target), quarterly data releases,
and the Chairman’s semiannual testimonies to
Congress. An exception is nonfarm productivity,
which entered the MMS dataset during the ana-
lyzed time period. The first surveyed number
refers to the first quarter of 1999.
Table 2, center column, offers a frequency
distribution for the coincidence of surprises in
macroeconomic data releases (MMS survey) and
monetary policy actions. For instance, in the
sample period of 1,527 trading days, there are
445 trading days on which there were no surprises
in data releases or monetary actions, possibly
because no data were released or no action taken.
There are 600 trading days (39 percent) with
more than one surprise and 268 trading days (18
percent) with more than two surprises. Table 2
(right column) offers a frequency distribution
with Federal Reserve communication included.
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7 Following Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), we use the
(unscaled) change in the price of the federal funds futures con-
tract due to expire in the following month if the FOMC meeting
took place within the last seven calendar days of the month.
8 See Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) for a discussion of
how measures of market expectations are measured in relation to
monetary policy actions.Kliesen and Schmid
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Table 1
Number of Total Macroeconomic Announcements and Monetary Policy Variables that
Correspond with Daily Inflation Compensation Observations
Data series Total (actual used)
Auto sales 77 (68)
Business inventories 77 (67)
Capacity utilization 77 (67)
Civilian unemployment rate 77 (67)
Construction spending 77 (72)
Consumer confidence 77 (69)
Consumer credit 77 (72)
Consumer price index (CPI-U) 77 (74)
CPI excluding food and energy (CPI-U, “core”) 77 (74)
Durable goods orders 77 (69)
Employment cost index (Q) 25 (25)
Existing home sales 61 (56)
Factory orders 77 (72)
Federal funds target: unscheduled FOMC meeting 4 (4)
Federal funds target: scheduled FOMC meeting 52 (50)
GDP price index (advance) (Q) 26 (26)
GDP price index (preliminary) (Q) 26 (22)
GDP price index (final) (Q) 26 (23)
Goods and services trade balance (surplus) 77 (74)
Chairman’s speeches and testimonies 145 (137)
Hourly earnings 74 (63)
Housing starts 77 (73)
Industrial production 77 (67)
Initial jobless claims (W) 334 (306)
Leading indicators 78 (73)
Purchasing managers index (PMI) 77 (65)
New home sales 78 (74)
Nonfarm payrolls 77 (66)
Nonfarm productivity (preliminary) 17 (16)
Nonfarm productivity (revised) 17 (17)
Personal consumption expenditures 78 (62)
Personal income 78 (62)
Producer price index (PPI) 77 (67)
PPI excluding food and energy (“core”) 77 (67)
Real GDP (advance) (Q) 26 (26)
Real GDP (final) (Q) 26 (22)
Real GDP (preliminary) (Q) 26 (23)
Retail sales 77 (72)
Retail sales excluding autos (“core”) 77 (72)
Treasury budget (surplus) 77 (71)
Truck sales 77 (68)
NOTE: Variables not included in the dataset of macroeconomic data releases are italicized. Monthly series if not indicated otherwise
(Q: quarterly; W: weekly). Numbers in parentheses indicate actual number of observations used in the analysis; this number differs
from total because of missing observations for the measures of inflation compensation due to holidays or unreported values.EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND
FINDINGS
The empirical approach rests on the follow-
ing regression equation:
(1)     
where rt – rt–1 is the change in the real interest rate
from trading day t –1 to trading day t; D is an indi-
cator variable that is equal to 1 if all explanatory
variables are equal to 0 (and is equal to 0 other-
wise); xt
k is the surprise component in the macro-
economic data release; fft is the surprise component
in the Federal Reserve action (the federal funds
target variable); and εt is an error term.9
The change in the real long-term interest rate
is measured by the daily change in the on-the-run
10-year TIIS yield. Although the Treasury has in
the past issued 5- and 20-year and a small number
of 30-year TIIS, we focus solely on the 10-year
yield because that is the maturity that has been
continuously issued since 1997. Figure 1 shows
rr D x f f tt kt
k
k





αβ γ ε . ..,
a kernel estimate of the distribution of this
dependent variable (thick line), along with a fre-
quency distribution (candlesticks) and a normal
distribution (blue line) based on the sample
moments. The change in the real interest rate
exhibits statistically significant excess kurtosis
(5.164) and mild but statistically significant skew-
ness (0.401).10
Table 3 shows the results of regression equa-
tion (1). The table shows traditional t values and—
because of the excess kurtosis of the dependent
variable—significance levels obtained from dis-
tribution free bootstrap t intervals (see Efron and
Tibshirani, 1993). The empirical results reported
in the table suggest that there are seven economic
announcements that matter: business inventories,
the employment cost index, the annualized rate
of growth of the GDP price index (preliminary
estimate), initial jobless claims, new home sales,
nonfarm payroll employment, and the preliminary
estimate of nonfarm labor productivity. With the
exception of new home sales, each of the coeffi-
cients has the predicted sign. That is, stronger-
Kliesen and Schmid
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Table 2
Frequency Distribution of Concurrence in Surprises
Number of surprises  MMS survey and  MMS survey, federal funds target, 





48 2 9 4
52 1 2 4





9 The intercept indicator variable, D, eliminates the influence of
certain observations on the observed mean of the dependent vari-
able—specifically, those observations for which none of the
explanatory variables contains information pertinent to the meas-
ured inflation compensation.
10 Excess kurtosis means that, compared with the normal distribution,
there is excess probability mass in the center of the distribution.
We use a Gaussian kernel along with an (under the null of normal
distribution) optimal bandwidth of (4/3)0.2 . σ ˆ . T –0.2, where T is
the number of sample observations and σ ˆ is the sample standard
deviation (Silverman, 1986).Kliesen and Schmid
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Table 3
On-the-Run 10-year TIIS Yield and Data Surprises
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-Statistic Bootstrap
Auto sales –2.715 . 10–3 –0.948
Business inventories –4.176 . 10–3 –2.114** **
Capacity utilization 1.476 . 10–4 0.056
Civilian unemployment rate –2.471 . 10–3 –1.587
Construction spending –7.883 . 10–4 –0.486
Consumer confidence 1.184 . 10–3 0.730
Consumer credit 1.425 . 10–3 1.210
Consumer price index (CPI-U, “core”) –3.002 . 10–3 –1.245
Durable goods orders 4.171 . 10–4 0.379
Employment cost index 4.972 . 10–3 1.978** *
Existing home sales 1.921 . 10–4 0.237
Factory orders –1.467 . 10–4 –0.051
Federal funds target 7.257 . 10–2 1.075
GDP price index (advance) 6.833 . 10–4 0.388
GDP price index (preliminary) 1.748 . 10–3 2.456** **
GDP price index (final) –1.595 . 10–3 –0.880
Goods and services trade balance (surplus) –1.039 . 10–3 –0.530
Hourly earnings –8.496 . 10–4 –0.520
Housing starts 3.213 . 10–4 0.165
Industrial production 4.051 . 10–3 1.028
Initial jobless claims –2.009 . 10–3 –3.103*** ***
Leading indicators 9.660 . 10–3 1.395
Purchasing managers index (PMI) 2.855 . 10–3 1.226
New home sales –2.990 . 10–3 –1.739* *
Nonfarm payrolls 3.840 . 10–3 3.057*** ***
Nonfarm productivity (preliminary) 5.764 . 10–3 2.263** *
Nonfarm productivity (revised) –3.469 . 10–3 –0.818
Personal consumption expenditures –3.529 . 10–3 –0.848
Personal income –2.310 . 10–3 –0.773
Producer price index (PPI, “core”) –9.685 . 10–5 –0.050
Real GDP (advance) 1.695 . 10–3 0.690
Real GDP (preliminary) –3.731 . 10–3 –1.282
Real GDP (final) –5.376 . 10–3 –1.498
Retail sales, excluding motor vehicles and parts (“core”) –2.279 . 10–4 –0.094
Treasury budget (surplus) –2.545 . 10–3 –0.958
Truck sales 2.776 . 10–3 0.847
Intercept indicator variable (D) 1.724 . 10–3 1.062






Rao’s score test 13.63***
Number of nonzero observations 1,082
Number of observations 1,527
NOTE: ***/**/* Indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels, respectively (t-tests are two-tailed). F-statistics and t-statistics are
Newey and West (1987) corrected. Federal funds target is not included in the MMS survey. F statistic (1): all MMS survey variables and
federal funds target; F-statistic (2): all MMS survey variables. The number of nonzero observations indicates the number of trading
days where there was a surprise in a macroeconomic data release or a monetary policy action priced in the market.than-expected economic growth raises the real
rate of interest. Recall that the announcement
surprises have been normalized by the sample
standard deviation of the individual forecasts
(measured over the entire sample). If stronger-
than-expected economic growth arises from a
productivity shock, then that growth raises the
desired capital stock; the real rate of interest must
rise to restore the goods-market equilibrium.
Indeed, our results show that we can reject the
null hypothesis that surprises in productivity
growth have no impact on the real long-term rate
of interest. 
Two other potentially interesting results from
Table 3 are worth mentioning. First, our results
suggest that surprise changes in the federal budget
deficit (surplus) have no discernable impact on
market participants who buy and sell 10-year TIIS.
Second, a surprise increase in inflation (growth
of the GDP price index) is expected to raise the
real long-term interest rate. The latter result is
perhaps puzzling given that the long-term real
interest rate is thought to be determined by real
factors (capital formation, productivity growth,
population, etc.). The R2 in Table 3 is about 5
percent, which implies that surprises in macro-
economic announcements explain only 5 percent
of the variation of the dependent variable around
its mean, the remainder being noise. Overall, the
results from Table 3 suggest that the real long-term
interest rate can change in response to surprise
increases in some macroeconomic data releases,
but that other factors appear to be more econom-
ically significant.
The results in Table 3 also allow us to specu-
late about the hypothesized linkage between the
effects of surprise changes in the federal funds
target rate. We find that surprises in changes of
the targeted federal funds rate have no discernable
impact on the real rate of interest. This finding
squares with Weiss (2006), who finds no measur-
able effect of the federal funds rate (as derived
from futures contracts) on the 10-year TIIS yield.
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) argue that
monetary policy surprises as gauged by changes
in federal funds futures prices are measured with
error. This is because federal funds futures prices
not only change in response to monetary policy
actions, but also respond to other information
Kliesen and Schmid
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Table 4
Instrumental-Variables Approach
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-Statistic Bootstrap
Federal funds target (GSS) 1.281 . 10–1 1.517 Not significant
Federal funds target (PR) 1.185 . 10–1 1.538 Not significant
NOTE: Neither regression coefficient is statistically significant (t-tests are two-tailed; t-statistics are Newey and West (1987) corrected).
GSS and PR indicate the federal funds market measure for monetary policy surprises as suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2002) and Poole and Rasche (2000), respectively.
Probability Density
Change in 10-Year TIIS Yield













Distribution of Daily Changes in the Real
Long-Term Interest Ratepertinent to the future path of the federal funds
rate. Because of the measurement error introduced
by such ambient price changes of federal funds
futures contracts, the regression coefficient of
the federal funds target variable is biased toward
0. We account for this error-in-variable problem
with an instrumental variables approach. We use
as an instrument for the federal funds target an
indicator equal to 1 if the federal funds target
exceeds its median positive value, equal to –1 if
it falls short of its median negative value, and
equal to 0 otherwise.11
Table 4 shows the regression results of the
instrumental variables approach applied to equa-
tion (1). We use two alternative definitions of the
surprise component of monetary policy actions
(the federal funds target variable). First, we provide
results for the concept that we used above—the
measure suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack, and
Swanson (2003), which is denoted federal funds
target (GSS) in the table. Second, we present
results for the surprise measure devised by Poole
and Rasche (2000); this measure is denoted federal
funds target (PR) in the table. Unlike the GSS
measure, which rests on the scaled price change of
the current month’s federal funds futures contract
(unless the monetary policy surprise happens
within the last seven days of the month), the PR
measure always uses the price change of the next
month’s federal funds futures contract. For the GSS
measure, the regression coefficient for the federal
funds target variable is indeed larger (in absolute
value) than it is without the error-in-variable cor-
rection (shown in Table 3) but remains statistically
insignificant. But, for the PR measure, the regres-
sion coefficient for the federal funds target variable
is smaller (in absolute value) than it is without
the error-in-variable correction (not shown); it
remains statistically insignificant as well.
Kliesen and Schmid
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11For details on this error-in-variable approach, see Greene (2003).
Table 5
Uncertainty about Real Interest Rates
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-Statistic Bootstrap
Panel A: GSS measure of federal funds target surprises
Federal Reserve communication –2.217 . 10–4 –0.493
Federal funds target 4.209 . 10–3 0.689
Intercept indicator variable (D) –4.828 . 10–4 –1.056
Intercept 1.243 . 10–3 2.774*** **
Number of nonzero observations 180
Number of observations 1,527
Panel B: PR measure of federal funds target surprises
Federal Reserve communication –1.139 . 10–4 –0.265
Federal funds target 5.118 . 10–3 0.653
Intercept indicator variable (D) –3.759 . 10–4 –0.859
Intercept 1.137 . 10–3 2.657*** *
Number of nonzero observations 182
Number of observations 1,527
NOTE: ***/**/* Indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels, respectively (t-tests are two-tailed). GSS and PR indicate the federal
funds market measure for monetary policy surprises as suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) and Poole and Rasche (2000),
respectively. The variable Federal Reserve Communication equals 1 on trading days on which the Chairman of the Federal Reserve’s
semiannual testimony to Congress (formerly known as Humphrey-Hawkins Testimony) or speeches and other testimonies of the Fed
Chairman were priced in the market. The number of nonzero observations indicates the number of trading days where there was a
surprise in a macroeconomic data release or a monetary policy action priced in the market.We have been unable to establish evidence
that monetary policy actions of the Federal
Reserve affect the real long-term rate of interest.
But the Federal Reserve has another channel of
influence—communication. As discussed above,
the surprise component in Federal Reserve com-
munication is next to impossible to ascertain. Yet,
following Kohn and Sack (2003), we can analyze
the effect of Federal Reserve communication on
the (conditional) variance of the dependent vari-
able; this variance may be viewed as a measure
of uncertainty that surrounds the future path of
real short-term interest rates. Note that, if Federal
Reserve communication and surprises in mone-
tary policy actions affect the uncertainty sur-
rounding the real rate of interest, then the error
term of the regression equation (1) is hetero-
skedastic; Rao’s score test on heteroskedasticity
indeed rejects the null hypothesis that there is
no such heteroskedasticity.12
We study the impact of Federal Reserve com-
munication and surprises in monetary policy
action on real interest rate uncertainty by analyz-
ing the squared residuals from regression equa-
tion (1)—as shown in Table 3—in an estimation
approach suggested by Amemiya (1977, 1978).
We regress these squared residuals on (i) the
(absolute value of the) federal funds target vari-
able, an indicator variable that is equal to 1 on
days when Federal Reserve communication was
priced in the market and 0 otherwise and (ii) the
previously introduced intercept indicator variable
(D). The regression results, presented in Table 5,
indicate that neither Federal Reserve communi-
cation nor monetary policy surprises influence
the conditional variance of the real rate of interest.
Hence, we do not reject the hypothesis that neither
surprises in Federal Reserve monetary policy
action nor Federal Reserve communication affect
the uncertainty surrounding the real long-term
interest rate.
CONCLUSION
The results in this paper suggest that real
interest rates—as measured by market yields on
Treasury inflation-indexed securities—respond
to surprise announcements of macroeconomic
data. Our findings are consistent with economic
theory, which suggests that stronger-than-expected
growth, perhaps caused by surprises in produc-
tivity growth, affects the real long-term interest
rate. In the case of nonfarm productivity growth,
the greater the surprise in the released nonfarm
productivity growth number, the greater the
accompanying increase in the real long-term rate
of interest. We found no evidence that surprise
increases in the monthly federal budget deficit
increase the real rate of interest. Further, we find
no evidence supporting the proposition that
Federal Reserve communication or surprises in
monetary policy actions—as gauged by changes in
the targeted federal funds rate—influence the
expected value or variance of the real long-term
interest rate. 
REFERENCES
Amemiya, Takeshi. “A Note on a Heteroscedastic
Model.” Journal of Econometrics, November 1977,
6(3), pp. 365-70.
Amemiya, Takeshi. “Corrigenda.” Journal of
Econometrics, October 1978, 8(2), p. 275.
Amemiya, Takeshi. Advanced Econometrics.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Balduzzi, Pierluigi; Elton, Edwin J. and Green, T.
Clifton. “Economic News and Bond Prices: Evidence
from the U.S. Treasury Department.” Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December
2001, 36(4), pp. 523-43.
Calomiris, Charles; Engen, Eric; Hassett, Kevin A.
and Hubbard, R. Glenn. “Do Budget Deficits
Announcements Move Interest Rates?” Unpublished
manuscript, December 22, 2003.
Efron, Bradley and Tibshirani, Robert J. Introduction to
the Bootstrap. New York: Chapman and Hall, 1993.
Faust, Jon; Rogers, John H.; Wang, Shing-Yi B. and
Wright, Jonathan H. “The High-Frequency Response
of Exchange Rates and Interest Rates to Macro-
Kliesen and Schmid
142 MARCH/APRIL 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
12 For Rao’s score test, see Amemiya (1985).economic Announcements.” Journal of Monetary
Economics (forthcoming, 2006).
Fleming, Michael J. and Remolona, Eli M. “What
Moves the Bond Market?” Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Economic Policy Review, December
1997, 3(4), pp. 31-50.
Fleming, Michael J. and Remolona, Eli M. “What
Moves Bond Prices?” Journal of Portfolio
Management, Summer 1999, 25(4), pp. 28-38.
Greene, William H. Econometric Analysis. 5th ed.
Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003.
Gürkaynak, Refet S.; Sack, Brian P. and Swanson,
Eric T. “Market-Based Measures of Monetary Policy
Expectations.” Working Paper, Division of Monetary
Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, August 1, 2002; www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2002/200240/200240pap.pdf.
Gürkaynak, Refet S.; Sack, Brian P. and Swanson,
Eric T. “The Excess Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest
Rates: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic
Models.” Working paper, Division of Monetary
Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, April 4, 2003; www.clevelandfed.org/
CentralBankInstitute/conf2003/august/ 
sensitivity_apr4.pdf.
Gürkaynak, Refet S.; Sack, Brian P. and Swanson,
Eric T. “The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates
to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for
Macroeconomic Models.” American Economic
Review, March 2005, 95(1), pp. 425-36.
Kohn, Donald L. and Sack, Brian P. “Central Bank
Talk: Does it Matter and Why?” Paper presented at
the Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, and Financial
Stability Conference in Honor of Charles Freedman,
Bank of Canada, Ottawa, Canada, June 20, 2003;
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2003/20030620/paper.pdf.
Kuttner, Kenneth N. “Monetary Policy Surprises and
Interest Rates: Evidence from the Fed Funds Futures
Market.” Journal of Monetary Economics, June 2001,
47(3), pp. 523-44.
Newey, Whitney K. and West, Kenneth D. “A Simple,
Positive Semi-definite, Heteroskedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.”
Econometrica, May 1987, 55(3), pp. 703-808.
Poole, William and Rasche, Robert H. “Perfecting the
Market’s Knowledge of Monetary Policy.” Journal
of Financial Services Research, December 2000,
18(2/3), pp. 255-98.
Poole, William; Rasche, Robert H. and Thornton,
Daniel L. “Market Anticipations of Monetary
Policy Actions.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review, July/August 2002, 84(4), pp. 65-93.
Silverman, Bernard W. Density Estimation for
Statistics and Data Analysis. London: Chapman
and Hall/CRC Press, 1986.
USA Today. “Poole Sees Stable Economy Ahead,”
Money Section, February 22, 2005.
Watson, Mark W. “Commentary.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2002, 84(4),
pp. 95-97.
Weiss, Laurence. “Inflation Indexed Bonds and
Monetary Theory.” Economic Theory, 2006, 27(1),
pp. 271-75.
Yellen, Janet. “Views on the Economy and Implications
for Monetary Policy.” Remarks delivered at the San
Diego Community Leaders Luncheon, September 8,
2005.
Kliesen and Schmid
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 2006 143144 MARCH/APRIL 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW